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Two modes of matching people with jobs prevail at present:  hierarchical planning and
distributed markets. Each has strengths and limitations, but few systems have been designed
to exploit strengths corresponding to both. With evolving information technology, the job-
matching process could be accomplished far more equitably and efficiently using Web-
based markets within the firm. Intelligent agents offer excellent potential to help both
potential employees and employers find one another in a distributed, electronic marketplace.
But realizing this potential goes well beyond simply changing the rules of internal job
matching or making agent technology available to job searchers. Rather, the corresponding
markets and technologies must be designed, together, to mutually accomplish the desired
results (e.g., efficient and effective matching) and conform to necessary properties (e.g.,
market clearing). In this chapter, we draw from Game Theory results to assess the feasibility
of using two-sided matching algorithms to address this market-design problem. We also
draw from current agent research to address the information technology dimension of
the problem by implementing a proof-of-concept multi-agent system to enact, automate
and support the corresponding market solution. This chapter integrates the key eco-
nomic and technological elements required to design robust electronic employment
markets. This chapter also presents preliminary results from a pilot experiment compar-
ing performance for a human-based job assignment process to alternative market
designs. These alternative designs can potentially reduce cycle-time and better match
employees to job vacancies.  How ver, the human-based process currently provides
better rule conformance. Future research into Web-based internal job markets should
address this shortcoming, among others.
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AGENT TECHNOLOGY IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR
In most developed countries, the public sector seems to lag behind private-sector firms
and organizations, particularly in terms of adopting advanced technology. Bureaucracy,
absence of competitive pressures and other reasons are often cited for this disparity between
public- and private-sector organizations, but the novel technology associated with software
agents appears to be deviating from this trend; that is, we find evidence of this advanced
information technology being developed and applied to military and governmental enter-
prises at the same rate asand in some cases ahead ofcorporations, businesses and firms.
For example, software agents are being applied to enable electronic commerce systems
for supply chain automation and support in a business-to-government (B2G) context
(Nissen, 2001), and agents are also being employed to help improve electricity allocation
and pricing decisions (Yan et al., 2000). And these applications are well ahead of agent
systems in use today in industry, for instance. Other applications (e.g., to facilitate citizen/
government interactions) are being conceptualized and developed in advance of private-
sector counterparts as well. How far can agent technology go toward automation and support
of the public sector? Literally, any public-sector process that involves knowledge and
information work (esp. paper-based workflows) offers potential for agent-based perfor-
mance improvements.
Yet agent technology is not a cure-all for public-sector performance ills. As we
describe in greater detail below, agent technology remains relatively immature. And as with
leading adoptions of any new or emerging technology, caution must be exercised to avoid
over-reliance on technology before it has suitably matured into what can be referred to as
industrial strength applications (cf. Nissen, 1998). In the case of software agents, to be
more specific, although they can be developed using artificial-intelligence techniques to
exhibit intelligent behavior, for many tasks (e.g., those involving creativity, judgment,
novel-problem-solving behavior), their performance is often inferior to that of people
assigned to do the same tasks. Alternatively, for tasks that can be specified well, requiring
only modest levels of intelligence to perform effectively, agent performance can surpass
that of people, particularly in terms of accuracy, speed and cost.
Further, not all agent designs and designers are equivalent. For instance, some agents
developed for a specific set of tasks may greatly exceed the capability and performance of
others developed for even these same, specific tasks. Which specific tasks and agent designs
are most appropriate in any given circumstance remains a matter for empirical investigation.
This chapter presents one of the very first such empirical investigations of human versus
agent performance, and we address the specific problems associated with matching employ-
ees with jobs in labor markets.
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT EMPLOYMENT
APPROACHES
Two modes of matching people with jobs prevail at present: 1) hierarchical planning
and 2) distributed markets. Patterned after centrally planned (e.g., former Soviet-style)
economies and command-and-control (e.g., the military) organizations, the former approach
remains prevalent for matching job candidates to jobs within the current enterprise. As an
example from the U.S. military, the Navy currently matches sailors to jobs using a





















centralized, labor-intensive detailing process, one which leaves many parties (e.g., sailors,
commands) dissatisfied and results in poor employee morale, performance and retention.
Alternatively, the latter, market-based approach supports unrestricted, point-to-point
matching between potential employees and outside employers. As an example from the
information technology (IT) environment, technology professionals in nearby Silicon
Valley currently have access to a hyperactive job marketcharacterized by negative
unemploymentin which a multitude of job opportunities is available to many people. In
this situation, information overloadfor example associated with the requirement to search
through, screen and filter myriad job opportunitieshas become problematic, and em-
ployee turnover is now incessant.
Evolving information technology offers great promise for the job-matching process to
be accomplished far more equitably and efficientlyfor example, using Web-based markets
within the firmand intelligent agents offer excellent potential to help both potential
employees and employers find one another in a distributed, electronic marketspace. But
realizing this potential goes well beyond simply changing the rules of internal job matching
or making agent technology available to job searchers. Rather, the corresponding
markets and technologies must be designed, together, to mutually accomplish the
desired results (e.g., efficient and effective matching) and conform to necessary
properties (e.g., market clearing). The putative performance effects of such marketspace
designs merit empirical evaluation.
Through the research described in this chapter, we build upon prior work in Game
Theory to assess the feasibility of using two-sided matching algorithms to address this
market-design problem. And we build upon prior agent research that created a proof-of-
concept multi-agent system to enact, automate and support the corresponding market
solution. In this chapter, we begin to empirically evaluate these research advances. The
balance of the chapter follows this introduction by discussing employment market econom-
ics, after which we summarize intelligent agent technology, including a summary of putative
benefits and limitations associated with this emerging technology. We then discuss a specific
agent-based employment market design, which is directed initially at an internal, hierarchi-
cal-planning employment process. We subsequently discuss empirical results of a pilot
experiment using this market design. The chapter closes with a number of key conclusions
and an agenda for future research along these lines.
LABOR MARKET ECONOMICS
As background, we draw from what is now textbook understanding of labor market
economics (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997). This discussion reviews market-based labor
markets, which are compared and contrasted with hierarchical labor markets. Moving into
current economics research, we then discuss two-sided matching games to describe the
mechanisms under consideration for incorporation into agent-based labor markets.
Market-Based Labor Markets
Market-based approaches to employee/employer matching rely on the interaction of
labor demand and supply (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997). Figure 1 illustrates labor demand
and supply curves for a representative labor market (e.g., manufacturing, software develop-
ment, clerical support). All units of labor are homogeneous (interchangeable) within a
market-based labor market. Jobs that require different skill levels are considered different



















labor markets. The wage rate in this market tends toward its equilibrium value (W*), where
the demand and supply curves intersect. The quantity of labor that employers willingly hire
at this wage rate exactly equals the quantity of labor that employees willingly supply (L*).
Anyone that wants to work in the industry can find sufficient work, and any firm that wants
to hire employees can find adequate employees.
If the wage rate is above its equilibrium value, there is an excess supply of labor. At the
higher wage rate, employers choose to hire less labor (by reducing output and/or replacing
labor with capital), while employees choose to supply more labor (through longer work-
weeks and/or new entrants to the industrys workforce). This results in an excess supply of
labor. The competition for jobs will force the wage rate to fall until the quantity of labor
demanded equals the quantity of labor supplied (i.e., the equilibrium wage rate). If the wage
rate is below equilibrium, opposite forces will create an excess demand for labor; compe-
tition for employees will increase the wage rate to its equilibrium value.
A subtle but important aspect of equilibrium wage rates involves job amenities (e.g.,
work environment, geographic location, commute, promotion potential, work content/
challenge, job satisfaction). In weighing employment benefits in one industry relative to
alternative time uses (e.g., leisure and other jobs), job amenities are important consider-
ations. If job amenities are particularly attractive in one industry, individuals will supply
labor to that industry at relatively low wage rates; if job amenities are unpleasant, labor is
only supplied at relatively high wage rates (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997; Moore and Viscusi,
1990). Compensating wage differentials are illustrated by comparing wage rates either
across industries (e.g., wage rates for schoolteachers versus garbage collectors or coal
miners) or for a particular industry across geographic locations or work environments.
Holding other characteristics constant, individuals willing to work in an industry for
relatively low wages either receive particularly high benefits from agreeable job amenities
or are relatively weakly deterred by objectionable job amenities.
Further developing labor demand and supply provides additional insight into market-
based labor markets. Labor demand is determined by the value employers derive from hiring
an additional employee (holding the levels of all other inputs constant). In for-profit
businesses, the market value of the extra output produced measures labors contribution. It
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Figure 1:  Market-based labor markets





















exceeds the cost of hiring that employee (i.e., the marginal value of labor exceeds the
marginal cost of labor). Firms hire employees if they value labor at or above the market wage
rate; firms (users) that generate values below the market wage rate choose not to hire labor.
Thus, market-based labor markets allocate labor to its highest valued (priority) uses; as the
market wage increases, lower valued uses drop out, while higher valued uses remain filled.
The labor supply in a particular industry reflects the relationship between the labor
employees willingly supply and the market wage rate (i.e., the wage rate implied here reflects
total compensation including salary, benefits, bonuses, others). Employees decisions
regarding the labor they will supply for a particular industry encompass both job amenities
and the benefits employees receive from the best alternative use of their time, including
either their value of leisure or the benefits forgone by not working in other industries. As
wages increase for the industry in question, the quantity of labor supplied typically increases.
At higher wage rates, the benefits of working in this industry increase relative to the value
of both leisure and employment in other industries. Individuals already working in the
industry may choose to work longer hours (if institutionally possible), and new employees
will choose to enter the industry (by entering the workforce and/or leaving other industries).
Thus, market-based labor markets ensure that the employees hired are the most willing to
work in the industry. Anyone can find work that is willing to work at or below the market
wage rate; individuals demanding higher wages choose to use their time in other ways. As
market wages decrease, individuals less willing to work voluntarily leave (either because
they have better alternative options or they are relatively less attracted (more put off) by the
jobs amenities); those most attracted to the industry remain.
Market-based labor markets balance demand and supply, ensuring equality between
the quantities of labor demanded and supplied. Moreover, market-based labor markets also
allocate labor to its highest valued uses (demand efficiency) and to the uses for which it is
best suited (supply efficiency). The demand and supply diagram depicted in Figure 1 only
considers a single industry (use) for labor (partial equilibrium). This tends to emphasize the
balance between demand and supply; it does not specifically illustrate that labor has other
uses. Demand and supply efficiencies become more important as the analysis expands to
multiple industries/labor markets (general equilibrium). The information requirements in
market-based labor markets also become more evident. To operate efficiently, employees
must have complete information about all relevant job opportunities, including salary,
benefits and job amenities (e.g., work environment and content, promotion potential,
commute).
To mimic the results of market-based labor markets, alternative labor market mecha-
nisms must both balance demand and supply and promote demand and supply efficiencies.
The information required to satisfy these conditions is extensive. To ensure demand and
supply efficiency, labor assignments must reflect labors relative value in alternative uses
and employee capabilities and job preferences.
Hierarchical Labor Markets
Hierarchical labor markets assign individuals to jobs using a centralized process.
Examples of hierarchical labor markets include job assignments within commercial firms,
government agencies and the militarys labor detailing process. Hierarchical job assign-
ments must rely on administrative procedures to match individual capabilities and job
requirements and to reflect both the jobs relative priority and the individuals job
preferences. There is no mechanism to automatically strike a balance between supply and
demand efficiencies, as in market-based labor markets. At one extreme, employers can



















assign individuals to jobs with little regard to personal preferences. Employees can either
accept the assignment or find an alternative occupation. This approach emphasizes the
employers performance (demand efficiency) at the expense of employee morale (supply
efficiency). At the other extreme, employers can emphasize individual job preferences
relative to job priority and the match between employee skills and job requirements. This
emphasizes employee morale (supply efficiency) at the expense of employer performance
(demand efficiency). Criticisms against hierarchical labor markets concern their inability to
ensure demand and supply efficiencies, inherent equilibrium conditions in market-based
labor markets. This inability reflects both information requirements and asymmetric
incentives (profits vs. morale).
Demand and supply efficiencies are particularly important for closed systems with a
constrained labor supply, such as commercial firms where labor requires significant firm-
specific knowledge or the military services and other government agencies. When labor
requires employer-specific skills, it is difficult to hire mid-career employees to fill areas of
need; employers develop an internal labor force through education, training and promotion,
and allocate this labor force across job vacancies. In the military and some commercial firms,
wages are uniform across jobs requiring similar skills and experience (no compensating
wages). As a result, the cost of assigning labor to one use is the loss of output in the best
alternative unfilled use for that labor (opportunity cost); salaries and benefits are irrelevant
in measuring labor costs. If labor assignments dont maximize demand and supply efficien-
cies, the system wastes resources by applying them to less valuable jobs, and reduces job
satisfaction, morale and retention by assigning labor to jobs that are relatively less desirable
with no compensating wage differential.
U.S. Navy example. To further illustrate the issues involved with hierarchical labor
markets, it is useful to briefly describe the U.S. Navys enlisted distribution system. Because
of the Navys large size, global presence, unique mission and policy of frequent employee
job rotation, it is extremely difficult to achieve efficient employee/job matching in this
system. The extreme nature of the Navy system makes it particularly attractive for research;
if problems with such an extreme system can be solved, then the results of this study should
also generalize quite well across many corporations, government agencies and other military
branches.
The Department of the Navy (DoN) uses a centralized, hierarchical labor market to
match enlisted sailors to jobs (U.S. Navy Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2000; U.S. Navy
Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, 2000). On the demand side, Navy
commands (e.g., ships, bases) identify open positions. Job vacancies are compared to
projections of available pers nnel. As the result of military force restructuring in the 90s,
the number of positions to be filled generally exceeds the supply of available personnel.
Therefore, the Navy develops a Navy Manning Plan that spreads the labor shortage across
all commands, on a fair-share basis. The Navy then prioritizes job vacancies based on each
commands mission, current staffing levels and several other relevant characteristics. This
process attempts to distinguish between high and low valued demands for labor, to mimic
demand efficiency in market-based labor markets.
On the supply side, available personnel are categorized according to their qualifica-
tions (ratings), including skills, experience, education/training, career path and others.
Similar skill groups are arranged in communities (e.g., electronics, supply, machinists).
Each community has a detailer charged with matching personnel to jobs. Sailors seeking job
assignments can express their personal preferences to the detailer. The detailer is responsive
to job vacancy priority ratings, but there is some room for discretion in tailoring job





















assignments to meet the sailors personal preferences (supply efficiency). Supply efficiency
is subordinate to demand efficiency in this process.
DoNs hierarchical labor market is further complicated, because enlisted sailors
change jobs every two to three years. Thus, the centralized detailing process reassigns one-
third to one-half of the enlisted force every year (e.g., 100,000150,000 people). This adds
a time dimension to the process that is more critical than in typical civilian labor markets.
The Navy begins identifying job vacancies and available personnel as early as nine months
in advance of planned rotation. Time also affects the job vacancy priority rating. More
imminent vacancies receive a higher priority than similar but less-urgent counterparts.
From this brief introduction, it is clear that DoNs centralized detailing process has
developed administrative mechanisms to try balancing the quantity of labor supplied and
demanded, as well as demand and supply efficiency. DoN fills billets (i.e., jobs) according
to a predetermined priority ranking until the labor supply is exhausted, and demand
efficiency is emphasized over supply efficiency. In market-based labor markets, equilibrium
wage rates automatically perform these functions; wages adjust until there is no excess
supply or demand for labor, and employees voluntarily choose their preferred job, consid-
ering both relative wages (compensating wage rates) and job amenities. In DoNs hierarchi-
cal labor market, wage rates do not increase to limit the demand for labor to the available
supply, so commanders are frustrated when they cant fill (even very important) vacant
positions. Similarly, wages do not adjust across job assignments to account for job amenities,
and assignments do not fully incorporate the sailors job preferences. Predictably, both
commanders and enlisted sailors voice dissatisfaction with the current hierarchical labor
market.
Two-Sided Matching Markets
Unlike fast-paced IT firms in Silicon Valley, wage rates for military personneland
most large corporationsare set by fiat (e.g., by Congress, the Personnel Department) and
adjust very slowly to supply- or demand-driven pressures. At least in the short term, the
Navyand most other large organizationscannot rely on spot labor markets for filling its
key jobs with qualified people. Indeed, without its current, hierarchical detailing system, the
Navy would find it very difficult to fill many of its important jobs. Yet the Navyas well
as other major enterprisescould also benefit from the efficiencies associated with market-
based systems. This conundrum leads us to draw from Game Theory and consider a two-
sided matching market (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). A two-sided matching market assigns
individuals to jobs when there are several possible employers and employees. The matching
algorithm balances the employers and employees preferences, but it can produce assign-
ments that give priority to either employers or employees. As such, the algorithm specifically
addresses both demand and supply efficiency. Two-sided matching algorithms are currently
used in assigning medical students to residency programs (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Roth,
1984; Roth and Peranson, 1997) and pledges to sororities at some colleges and universities
(Mongell and Roth, 1991).
The market for medical residents illustrates the two-sided matching system. As U.S.
students complete their final year of medical school, they interview for residency positions.
Each student interviews with several residency programs, and each program interviews
several students. After the interviews, students rank residency programs according to their
individual preferences, and programs independently rank students according to their
preferences. Students and programs submit their prioritized lists to a central clearinghouse.
The clearinghouse compares the lists and assigns students to programs. On a predetermined



















date, students and residency programs receive their assignments. Each matched student
is assigned to one residency program, and each program is assigned students up to the
number of available positions. Unmatched students individually seek unfilled positions;
programs with unfilled positions can seek either unmatched U.S. medical students or
foreign-trained students.
Participating in this centralized assignment process is voluntary. Residen y programs
and medical students are free to establish individual agreements, but over 90% of assign-
ments are made through this voluntarily, centr lized process. To generate this participation
level, the matching process must satisfy a few basic conditions. One of the most important
conditions is stability: both students and programs must be at least as happy with their
assigned match as with any agreement they could reach outside the centralized process. The
outcome is unstable if a student and program both prefer one another to the respective
program and student with which they are centrally matched. With unstable matches, the
student and program would both choose to forgo the assigned match and form their own
agreement. If a student is not matched to his or her highest ranked program, the program must
have been assigned students that it ranked more highly (i.e., the program would not reject
the assigned match). If a program does not receive its highest ranked students, these students
must be matched with programs they rank more highly (i.e., the students would not reject the
assigned match). Roth (1991) describes the problems encountered when programs dont
meet these requirements.
To summarize, as currently implemented for matching medical students with residency
programs, the two-sided matching market addresses a number of the differences between
hierarchical and market-based labor markets. Most importantly, unlike hierarchical systems,
matching markets balance both employers and employees preferences. This effectively
matches job requirements and employee capabilities, and systematically helps obviate many
supply side problems, including employee dissatisfaction, low morale and poor retention.
This improves both demand and supply efficiency relative to hierarchical labor markets.
Two-sided matching markets also are responsive enough to keep pace with the extreme
periodic job rotations effected routinely by the Navy and other military organizations. But
such matching markets lack the automatic dynamic response of market-based systems, and
the opportunity for side agreements that circumvent the system can be administratively
cumbersome. Finally, unlike market-based systems, two-sided matching markets provide
some centralized control through the clearinghouse, and periodic matching can dampen the
high rates of employee turnover now experienced in high-technology industries.
Despite these positive results, other potential problems must be addressed. The
matching algorithm considers both the students and programs preferences, but there are
generally multiple stable equilibria. Different matching algorithms give different relative
emphasis to employer (demand) and employee (supply) preferences. Thus, the balance
between demand and supply preferences depends on the matching algorithm (Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990, pp. 33-48). Furthermore, the residency-matching program does not
distinguish between high and low valued uses in allocating the limited supply of U.S. medical
students to residency programs. Programs that might be considered high in priority may fail
to match with any students, forcing the program to either contract with unmatched U.S.
students, hire foreign-trained students or leave the residency unfilled (Roth and Sotomayor,
1990, pp.143-45). Closed, internal labor markets, such as DoN, cannot fill high priority
vacancies with outside labor. Thus, it is important to modify the matching process to
recognize job priorities, a function performed by detailers in DoNs hierarchical process.
Finally, two-sided matching markets require a significant exchange of information to work





















effectively. Employees must identify and rank the relevant job opportunities; employers
must identify and rank the relevant employees. Mechanisms that help exchange the relevant
information can significantly improve demand and supply efficiency. To address this
situation, we harness the power of intelligent agent technology and seek to extend current
thinking in terms of two-sided matching markets.
INTELLIGENT AGENT TECHNOLOGY
Work in the area of software agents has been ongoing for some time, and it addresses
a broad array of applications. Building upon research in the supply chain domain (e.g.,
Mehra and Nissen, 1998; Nissen and Mehra, 1998; Nissen, 2001), agent technology has
particular promise to automate and support electronic labor markets. As computational
artifacts, they help overcome human cognitive limitations (e.g., limited memory and
processing speed), supporting rapid search and effective filtering through huge numbers of
available jobs and potential employees. Further, agents possessing some artificial intelli-
gence (AI) can employ inferential mechanisms (e.g., rules, cases, scripts) to depict and
consider diverse individuals preferences. In a domain with over 100,000 available jobs and
prospective employees (e.g., the Navy)in which both employers and potential employees
have specific, idiosyncratic needs and preferencesno other, extant information technol-
ogy offers the automation and support capability provided by software agents.
In this section, we discuss some representative, extant agent technologies and then
outline key capabilities of the Personnel Mall, a proof-of-concept multi-agent system
developed to enact, automate and support an electronic employment market. This agent
application emerged through research to adapt the Intelligent Mallits predecessor appli-
cation for matching buyers and sellers in products and services marketsto focus on
matching people with jobs in labor markets. Our focus on this implemented, multi-agent
system serves to demonstrate that the kinds of agent-based electronic employment markets
discussed in this chapter are not simply concepts of theory or items of speculation. Rather,
they build upon demonstrated information technology and provide insight into the kinds of
electronic marketspaces that are now becoming technically feasible.
Extant Agent Technologies
Following the literature survey and classification system of Nissen (2001), extant agent
applications can be grouped into four classes: 1) information-filtering agents, 2) informa-
tion-retrieval agents, 3) advisory agents and 4) performative agents. Other groupings from
the literature on agents could potentially be used (e.g., Bradshaw, 1997; Franklin and
Graesser, 1996; Nwana, 1996; White, 1997), but this classification scheme helps compare
various agent capabilities that are applicable to markets and matching processes. Tables 1-
4 summarize a number of representative, extant agent applications relevant to markets and
matching processes. Specifically, most information-filtering agents (Table 1) focus on tasks
such as passively applying user-input preferences to screen and sort e-mail, network
newsgroups, frequently asked questions and arbitrary text.
Information-retrieval agents (Table 2) address problems associated with collecting
information pertaining to commodities such as compact disks and computer equipment, in
addition to services such as advertising and insurance. We also include the ubiquitous Web-
indexing robots in this class, along with Web-based agents for report writing, publishing,
assisted browsing and other applications listed in the table. Such active information retrieval


















p Inc.represents an important market task, and many commercial shopping bots are beingdeveloped to do this in a variety of product and service markets.Advisory agents (Table 3) provide intelligent advice, and perform something of a classical
decision-support role. Examples include recommendations for CDs and movies, an electronic
concierge, an agent host for college campus visits, planning support for manufacturing systems
and other applications listed in the table. More recently, work on agents to provide advice on
matching buyers with sellers and decision-support agents have addressed the markets and
matching domain directly. Unlike commercial shopping bots (i.e., information retrieval
agents), agents in this third class decide for themselves what information is needed; then they seek
out and use this information to make recommendations for users.
Finally, performative agents (Table 4) are the most sophisticated with respect to the
state of the art. They often draw on agent capabilities in other classes (e.g., information
filtering, information-retrieval, advisory), but performative agents also perform important
knowledge- and information-work activities, changing the state of the external world (e.g.,
executing binding commercial transactions) through autonomous, deliberate action. In
contrast, less sophisticated agents can only support people in performing these activities.
Examples of performative agents include marketspaces in which agents can conduct
business transactions, auction environments in which agents buy and sell on behalf of their
users, and several agent system esigns for negotiation. Performative agents also automate
knowledge work, such as scheduling, offer an autonomous cooperative-learning environ-
ment and provide digital library services.
Table 1:  Information-filtering agent applications (Adapted from Nissen, 2001)
Table 2:  Information-retrieval agent applications (Adapted from Nissen, 2001)
Representative Application Literary Source 
Filter e-mail messages Maes, 1994; Malone et al., 1987 
Filter network newsgroup postings Sycara & Zeng, 1996 
Filter frequently asked questions (FAQs) Whitehead, 1994 
Filter arbitrary text messages Verity, 1997 
 
Representative Application Literary Source 
Collect product/service information  Krulwich, 1996; uVision, 1997; PriceWatch, 1997; 
Insurance, 1997 
Web robots & publication tools Etzioni & Weld, 1995; Chen et al., 1998; Amulet, 
1997; InterAp, 1995 
Assisted Web browsing Burke et al., 1997 
Technical information gathering & delivery Knobloch & Ambite, 1997; Bradshaw et al., 1997 
Shopping bots Krantz, 1999 
 





















The Personnel Mall is best categorized in the fourth group (i.e., performative agents).
It builds upon agent work in other categories, exhibiting behaviors such as information
filtering and retrieval.  But, it can be used in a performative role as well as an advisory one.
Central to the Personnel Malls potential is its ability to represent a multitude and wide
variety of different userson both the demand and supply sidesto quickly find, retrieve
and organize large amounts of market information. Its conformance to market and organi-
zational rules, established for a particular enterprise r circumstance, enables this multi-
agent system to automate and support commerce in a broad diversity of electronic markets
(e.g., including regulation-laden, hierarchical systems). Such ability suggests the Personnel
Mall offers good potential to enact, automate and support the kinds of electronic labor
markets addressed through this research.
Table 3:  Advisory agent applications (Adapted from Nissen, 2001)
Table 4:  Performative Agent Applications (Adapted from Nissen, 2001)
Representative Application Literary Source 
Recommend compact discs & movies Maes, 1997; Nguyen & Haddawy, 1999 
E-concierge services Etzioni & Weld, 1995 
Campus visit host Zeng & Sycara, 1995 
Planning support Maturana & Norrie, 1997; Pinson et al., 1997 
Project coordination advice Johar, 1997 
Computer interface assistance Ball et al., 1997 
Military reconnaissance support Bui et al., 1996 
Financial portfolio advice Sycara, et al., 1996 
Buyer/seller matchmaking advice Freuder & Wallace, 1999 
Supply chain decision support Goodwin et al., 1999 
 
Representative Application Literary Source 
Business marketspace Chavez & Maes, 1996; Fox et al., 2000; Hu et al., 1999; 
Mehra & Nissen, 1998; Nissen & Mehra, 1998; Preece et 
al., 1999 
Auction marketspace Rodriguez-Aguilar et al., 1998; Hu et al., 1999; Sandholm, 
1999 
Agent negotiation Bui, 1996; Collins et al., 2000; Guttman et al., 1998; Maes 
et al., 1999; Sun et al., 1999; Tesauro & Kephart, 2000 
Scheduling Sen, 1997; Walsh et al., 1997 
Cooperative learning Boy, 1997 
Digital library services Mullen & Wellman, 1996 
 




















As noted above, the Personnel Mall is a proof-of-concept multi-agent system
developed to enact, automate and support a Web-based marketspace for employee/job
matching (cf. Gates and Nissen, 2001). To describe this multi-agent system, we first
discuss the Navy enlisted sailor distribution and assignment process, which the multi-
agent system is designed to automate and possibly replace. We then describe the
Personnel Mall application and outline several putative performance improvements it
is likely to effect over the current, hierarchical detailing process. The key is understand-
ing that the Personnel Mall currently automates and supports such matching of products
and services along the enterprise supply chain.
The Distribution and Assignment Process
We examine and discuss the basic detailing process and use it for context to
describe the Personnel Malls agent federation in the section that follows. The high-
level process delineated in Figure 2 depicts the integration of the command, detailer and
sailor along a hierarchical labor market. Notice the distribution and assignment process
involves an intermediary (i.e., the Detailer) that matches command needs with available
sailors in the marketspace.
The process begins with a command in the organization identifying a need and
determining its job requirements (e.g., for an electronics technician, machinist mate).
This information is submitted to the personnel command for prioritization. Indepen-
dently, sailors nearing their job-rotation windows begin conversing with detailers and
attempt to convey their job preferences. The detailer then uses this information to match
prospective sailors with jobslooking first to satisfy the needs of the Navy, and second
to accommodate sailor preferencesand begins a negotiation process until agreement
(or at least consent) is reached with the sailor. The detailer then issues orders, and the
sailor reports for duty as specified. The process concludes with the sailors services
being used by his or her assigned command.
Personnel Mall Application
The Personnel Mall is developed for employer/employee-matching enactment, auto-
mation and support. Like its predecessor systemcalle  the Intelligent Mall, which was
developed for matching buyers with vendors in products and services marketsthe
ID rqmts








Figure 2:  Basic detailing process





















Personnel Mall employs a shopping mall metaphor for employer/employee-matching. In a
mall, shoppers (employers) are not expected to know in advance which shops (employees)
exist or what products (qualifications) they offer for sale. Neither are the shops (employees)
expected to know a priori what other shops (employees) are available or which shoppers
(employers) will enter their store.
The Personnel Mall ontology includes entities appropriate for labor markets (e.g.,
employers [commands], employees [sailors], jobs, wages). However, age t-enabled
marketspaces provide a qualitative contrast to physical labor marketplaces; instead of
employers and employees searching, matching, hiring and accepting within physical
markets, these market and matching activities are performed by software agents that
represent employers and employees. The agentsimplemented through software objects
and methodscommunicate and coordinate their activities by exchanging messages with
one another. We refer to this application as a Personnel Mallas opposed to the more
common virtual mall or cyber mall namesbecause it offers more than just virtual
shopping. Every entity in this environment possesses (artificial) intelligence, and the agent
federation is performative, possessing the capability to autonomously search and match on
behalf of commands and sailors alike.
The mall representation presented in Figure 3 shows six intelligent agents repre-
senting sailors, three agents representing commands and one command agents shop-
ping list (i.e., input form). The shopping list specifies the jobs to be filled through the
marketspace agent federation. This mall is truly virtual; commands and sailors do not
reside in any single physical location. Indeed, the commands and sailors physical
location is irrelevant. What is relevant is that an agent is created to represent every sailor
or command interested in participating in this marketspace. Notice there is no agent or
explicit intermediary representing the Detailer. Command and sailor agents interact
directly through this electronic labor market.
To launch a command agent, an officer needs only network access to the agent server
(we provide a Web interface for this) and a common Web browser. Any practical number
Figure 3:  Personnel Mall screenshot



















of command agents can co-exist in this mall. Thus, the application offers good potential to
scale well to large enterprises such as the Navy. Not apparent in the figure is a special agent
called Host. Command agents register their job openings (e.g., onboard ships at sea,
assigned to ships in port, shore positions), and the Host maintains both a White Pages and
a Yellow Pages directory for the mall. Such directories are used to support both sailors
and commands search through available job listings and applicants, respectively. These
directories obviate many human cognitive limitations that impede market efficiency.
A command agent can be specialized to reflect the preferences and priorities of its
principal (e.g., Commanding Officer). For example, one command agent can be specialized
to search and match based on one officers preferences for education and training over rank
and experience, whereas anothers (i.e., identical clone) can be specialized to reflect
different (even opposing) preferences. Each command agent can be instantiated with a
unique shopping list of job openings. Other knowledge and informationsuch as user
preferences and budget restrictions, product requirements and need dates, and consumer
heuristics like price comparisonare formalized through rules for the agents.
As an example, suppose an employer has a job opening.  Further, the employer prefers
employees with technical backgrounds to those with only managerial experience, but refuses
to pay more than $2,000 per week.  Finally, the employee must be hired within one week.
Using Structured English for explication, two rules to reflect such employer preferences can
be written as follows:
Rule 101.
IF applicant-background(X) = technical
AND salary(X) < 2000
AND availability(X) < 1 week
THEN hire(X) = T
Rule 102.
IF applicant-background(X) = managerial
AND salary(X) < 2000
AND availability(X) < 1 week
THEN hire(X) = T
Rules 103  n.
In a top-down rule interpreter, Rule 101 is considered first. If all the antecedent
conditions of Rule 101 are satisfied by the applicant, then a decision is made to hire this
(technical) individual (i.e., hire = T or True). Otherwise, Rule 101 does not hire (i.e., a
decision is not made to hire this (technical) individual), and Rule 102 is considered in turn.
Likewise, if the applicant satisfies all the antecedent conditions of Rule 102, then a decision
is made to hire this (managerial) individual. Otherwise, Rule 102 does not hire, the next rule
(e.g., Rule 103) is considered in turn and so forth (e.g., through Rule n). The knowledge
engineer develops an appropriate set of rules during the agent-design phase, but individual
users (e.g., commands) can modify rules to reflect their particular preferences.
Sailor agents represent sailors wishing to participate in the Personnel Mall. Require-
ments for launching a sailor agent are similar to those pertaining to command agents. Sailor
agents express their intent to participate in the mall (open a shop) by registering with the
Host. For instance, sailor agents register individual sailors attributes in the Hosts White
Pages (e.g., rank, education, training, job skills, availability, community) and search the
mall Hosts Yellow Pages to view a complete, current listing of job openings. Sailors use





















these listings to identify specific assignments that particularly interest them, and they use an
input form to convey their relative preferences among this subset of job assignments.
Job preferences and matching. One specific, sailor-agent input form is displayed in
Figure 4. Notice the relative preferences listed in Sailor-2s input form. The sailors first
preference is for a job opening on Ship-C; the Yellow Pages would include details for this
job (not shown in the figure), which might indicate that this assignment involves sea duty
onboard a surface combatant scheduled for a tour through a region of potential conflict.
Details also indicate this particular assignment provides a good match with the sailors
education, training, skills and experience. Therefore, this particular assignment represents
a good career move for this particular sailor. Clearly, other individual sailors will have
different and unique preferences and appropriate career moves, which they similarly express
through input forms for their personal sailor agents.
Continuing down Sailor-2s ranked list of assignment preferences, this particular sailor
would like to attend an advanced training school (e.g., in electronics, computer technology),
if not selected by the Ship-C command. Advanced training would also represent a good
career move for this sailor, and the Personnel Mall enables each individual sailor to express
career ambitions and priorities through job rankings. Still lower on the list, this sailor
identifies an assignment on Ship-A, scheduled to remain in port, as a third-priority
alternative. Fourth on the list is a position as lifeguard for a Navy swimming pool in
California, and the last item represents a recruiting assignment. Using this sailor-specific
information, the Personnel Mall explicitly considers each sailors preferences when match-
ing sailors with job openings, and sailors agents can work to get matches with the sailors
highest-priority jobs.
The problem with these simple-ranked listings, however, is that they do not reflect
relative preferences between different sailors. For instance, suppose Sailor-2 and Sailor-6
both list the same first- and second-ranked job preferences, Ship-C and advanced school,
respectively. Sailor-6 may be desperate for this sea-duty tourand consider attending the
advanced school to be a substantially inferior alternativewhereas Sailor-2 may only
marginally prefer Ship-C to school. A simple preference ranking would not provide the
Personnel Mall with sufficient information to intelligently assign the sailors, based on the
relative strengths of their assignment rankings (i.e., assign Sailor-6 to sea duty and Sailor-
2 to school). In other words, ordinal sailor preference rankings are sufficient to match the
most-desired assignments for any individual sailor, but they do not support rankings based
on comparisons across individuals.
The Personnel Mall employs a quasi-price system to support comparisons across
sailors. Notice Sailor-2s input form in Figure 4 lists quasi-prices corresponding to the
Sailors relative job preferences. Sailors use quasi-prices to quantify their relative prefer-
ences between alternative job assignments. This effectively transforms the matching
problem from one relying on ordinal scales (e.g., ranked job alternatives) to one quantifying
individuals relative utility associated with diverse jobs (e.g., using consistent numerical
prices, ratings, scores, credits or quasi-pricing instruments). This is comparable to the
manner in which a centralized market (e.g., stock exchange) uses relative prices (e.g., price
per share) to compare values across diverse products (e.g., securities), or the manner in
which employees express their job preferences in market-based labor markets by selecting
between jobs based in part on relative wages. This aspect of the Personnel Mall compares
favorably with the outcomes of market-based markets discussed above, and expands on the
two-sided matching algorithms. The command agent rules in our Personnel Mall currently
select the lowest priced sailor(s) for each job.



















Personnel Mall operation. Figure 5 presents a still-shot of some animated search
and match activities. When a command has specified the jobs to be filled (using the Host
input form described above), each command agent sends messages to all sailor agents
in the Personnel Mall that have expressed interest, through the Hosts White Pages, in
jobs on its shopping list. Sailor agents wishing to apply for posted jobs reply directly to
the requesting command agents, responding separately to each interested command.
Each command agent analyzes the messages and determines a preferred sailor for every
listed job, based on user preferences (e.g., quasi-prices) and other sailor information
(e.g., rank, community, experience).
Each command agent then determines which sailor agents to visit (i.e., to negotiate
a match), establishes the order in which to visit the sailor agents and consolidates multiple
job openings into a single trip. Notice the command agent visiting Sailor-2 is inverted. Such
behavior is explicitly required by regulation in this mall environment, for instance when
sea duty is required. Although humorous, perhaps, this behavior visibly demonstrates that
intelligent agents can conform to various personnel regulations (e.g., governing sea/shore
duty rotations, experiential requirements, Navy needs). Although difficult to see without
animation, the command agent visiting Sailor 1 is currently jumping up and down, which
represents the local custom when interacting with people in the community of Sailor-1.
Similar to the regulation-conforming behavior above, this context-specific behavior demon-
strates that intelligent agents can also be sensitive to local customs and variations (e.g., when
interacting with sailors from the surface, submarine or aviation communities). The number
and kinds of such behaviors specified for intelligent agents are virtually unlimited.
When all discussions have been completed with a given sailor agent, the command
agent proceeds to the exit, where messages are exchanged to extend and accept offers,
document the match and issue orders. Each command agent then moves to fill the next job
on its list, matches the corresponding sailors and continues in this fashion until all jobs have
Figure 4:  Personnel Mall sailor agent job preferences form





















Figure 5:  Personnel Mall animation
been filled or no sailors are available to fill jobs still on the list. This latter condition reflects
one of excess demand for a particular sailor skill/experience set.
Thus, the Personnel Mall is subject to the same market principles and dynamics
discussed above in terms of labor markets. As with two-sided matching algorithms, the
Personnel Mall appears to offer substantial improvement over hierarchical planning systems
(e.g., eliminates the Detailer role, explicitly considers employer and employee preferences)
and offers advantages only attainable through electronic markets (e.g., provides access to
and helps manage search through abundant, market-wide information, automates many
search and matching tasks). The dynamic and emergent behaviors associated with this
distributed application are very rich and can be quite powerfulparticularly where intelli-
gent, autonomous, persistent agents are free to roam the network and conduct business on
behalf of their users.
Putative Benefits and Limitations of the Personnel Mall
To summarize the key points from this discussion, the Personnel Mall is a proof-of-
concept multi-agent system developed to enact, automate and support a marketspace for
employee/job matching. Based on in-depth knowledge of the Navy detailing process, the
Personnel Mall has been instantiated with agents that collaborate in a small federation to
perform most search and matching activities required for the marketspace. The application
represents and flexibly supports a variety of users and closely integrates commands and
sailors employment search and matching processes. The Personnel Mall is also designed to
conform to policies, rules and regulations that govern personnel, but the job search and
matching process and activities it supports represent many hierarchical distribution and
assignment systems, in business, government, university, military and other enterprises.
With these capabilities, the Personnel Mall can be used at present to enact, automate
and support search and matching in electronic labor markets, just as intelligent malls perform



















such functions for products and services along the supply chain. Relative to archaic
centralized planning systems or crude information-retrieval bots used in labor markets
today, this innovative application of agent capability is expected to improve performance
considerably (e.g., in terms of increased speed, greater information gathering, improved
preference matching).
For instance, drawing from analogous performance increases affected through our
comparable supply chain multi-agent system (i.e., the Intelligent Mall), benefits begin by
disintermediating the distribution and assignment process, obviating the Detailer. As noted
and explained above, the Personnel Mall can automatically perform most process activities
required t  match sailors with jobsthrough its federation of intelligent agentswhich
eliminates the need for an organization of detailing personnel and associated staff. To
provide a sense of magnitude, the Navy currently employs roughly 450 detailers and support
personnel to perform distribution and assignment activities; some $30M, annually, could
potentially be saved annually by implementing a multi-agent application such as the
Personnel Mall (Schlegel, 2000).
Additionally, Mall agents perform their search and matching tasks very quickly,
gathering and considering substantial information in the process. Pilot experiments in the
supply chain domain suggest similar, autonomous agents operate at least an order of
magnitude faster than people assigned to perform the same tasks. Agents can also handle
information overload, effectively processing much, much larger sets of job/sailor alterna-
tives than their human counterparts. This suggests the lead-time required for assigning
sailors to jobs can be reduced, perhaps to an interval so small it approaches just-in-time
distribution and assignment. Alternatively, the period between assignments could be
extended, simultaneously matching much larger groups of sailors (faces) and jobs (spaces),
to improve the quality of fit between faces and spaces. In either case, an intelligent multi-
agent system effectively eliminates constraints currently limiting the detailing process (i.e.,
process time, information overload).  Future analysis will determine the detailing process
design that best exploits these improvements.
Redesigning the detailing process offers several additional benefits. The Personnel
Mall makes all job information available to sailorsand all sailor information available to
commandsso personnel can search and rank alternatives from the complete listing of
available Navy jobs. This addresses a common complaint from sailors: detailers fail to tell
them about more than a handful of the job opportunities that the Navy needs filled. Exit
interviews with sailors leaving the Navy suggest the distrust stemming from such behavior
represents a significant factor in the decision not to re-enlist (Schlegel, 2000; Short, 2000).
Another putative benefit involves sailors relative job preferences. Because the
Personnel Mall explicitly matches sailors with job assignments based on quantitative
preference information, personnel are more likely to be assigned to their preferred com-
mands, which ostensibly promotes better job performance than expected from sailors
assigned to less-preferred jobs. Improved job assignments also offer the potential for
improved personnel retention, providing a better return on investment in sailors education
and training and increasing the overall level of experience in the Navy. And clearly,
increased personnel retention decreases recruiting demands, with potentially many, addi-
tional millions of dollars in annual cost avoidance associated.
In contrast, this Personnel Mall application also has potential limitations. As currently
designed, it is effectively limite  to one-sided matching; job assignments reflect the sailors
preferences, emphasizing supply efficiency (i.e., assignments reflect sailors preferences as
expressed in their quasi-prices). Demand efficiency suffers, because assignments are not





















based on the sailors job qualifications and Navy needs. This contrasts to the Navys current
hierarchical detailing system (i.e., matching based primarily on sailors job qualifications
and Navy needs, emphasizing demand over supply efficiency), which suggests that incorpo-
rating two-sided matching into the Personnel Mall may offer good potential. A potential to
incorporate two-sided matching is briefly discussed in the appendix for the interested reader.
More importantly, the Personnel Malland any similar emerging agent technology
is still experimental in nature and not yet mature or ready for industrial strength application
(e.g., to Navy-wide distribution and assignment). This calls for empirically evaluating how
this technology addresses the kinds of distribution and assignment activities required by the
Navy, before seriously discussing implementation. Such empirical evaluation represents the
focus of the following sections.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design involves a pilot experiment that compares detailing process
outcomes for human subjects, the Personnel Mall and the two-sided matching algorithm.
This pilot experiment is exploratory. We are far more interested in identifying the key
concepts, relationships and challenges associated with this domain and marketspace than
confirming some set of hypotheses that are well grounded in theory and the literature. Indeed,
to date, there is negligible theory and very little literature to address the specific, interdis-
ciplinary problem studied in this investigation.
As such, the experiment involves a common set of detailing tasks that represent the
Navy personnel distribution and assignment environment. One group of subjects performs
this same set of detailing tasks. The performance of this subject group is compared with that
of the Personnel Mall, which performs the detailing tasks automatically, and a two-sided
matching algorithm. Performance is measured in terms of quality, cost and cycle time. Each
of these research-design aspects is described in turn.
Detailing Tasks
As noted above, detailers match personnel requirements (billets) submitted by various
commands with personnel available for periodic job rotation. To some extent, detailers
accommodate sailors assignment preferences through such matching, but the needs of the
Navy come first by policy (i.e., demand efficiency is stressed); high-Navy-priority jobs must
be filled before lower priority jobs can be offered to otherwise-qualified sailors. In this
experimental task environment, each participant is given a list of eight open billets
associated with six jobs. This list of jobs and corresponding number of billets is summarized
in Table 5, and the experimental instructions are provided in Appendix B for reference. The
jobs are ranked in the order of priority established by the Navy.
Notice the heavy horizontal line that bisects the six jobs listed in Table 5. Jobs listed
above the line represent high-priority assignments; these positions must be filled before
any sailors can be assigned to jobs appearing below the line. This reflects current detailing
practice. Deploying sailors aboard ship, both at sea and in ort, represents a high Navy
priority; recruiting duty also is currently high priority, due in part to the retention problems
noted above. All five corresponding positions (i.e., 2 on Ship C, 1 on Ship A, 2 for recruiting
duty) must be filled before any sailor can be assigned to the advanced school or serve as either
a lifeguard or bartender (these latter two jobs are somewhat fictitious and included for
contrast). Every participant in the experiment is given this same list of open billets. Because



















this task closely resembles those performed by professional detailers in practice, we expect
the results of this pilot experiment to generalize well to naval personnel practice.
Participants are also given a list of sailors eligible for assignment to these jobs. For
instance, they are have attained the appropriate rank, serve withi  the applicable service
community, due for periodic rotation and have the proper education, training, background,
experience, etc. Subjects are also provided with a rank-ordered listing that shows each
sailors preferences for the set of six jobs above. The sailors and rank-ordered preferences
are summarized in Table 6. For instance, Sailor 1 would most prefer to be a lifeguard. If this
job were not available, Sailor 1 would next prefer assignment to Ship A. Attending school
is next on the list, followed by recruiting, sea duty on Ship C, and finally, the bartender job
represents this sailors lowest-priority job. Relative preferences for the other five sailors in
Table 6 are interpreted similarly. Every participant is given this same list of sailors and
corresponding job preferences.
Each participant is also provided a unique ordering in which the six sailors are to be
assigned. This reflects the somewhat random sequence and timing associated with matching
specific sailors to jobs. In the current distribution and assignment process, detailers match
sailors to jobs in relatively small batches (bi-weekly), and the mix of sailors in each batch
changes as a function of time. Timing is important, because detailers are required to fill all
jobs above the line before any sailors can be matched with positions below the line. This
process emphasizes demand efficiency; although detailers try to accommodate sailors job
preferences, the needs of the Navy must be served first. Thus, the relative timing of job
openings above the line has much to do with any individual sailors chances of being
assigned to a particular job.
This dynamic and policy is reflected in our experiment through randomized orderings
of sailor assignments. For instance, Subject-1 may receive the ordering (6,5,4,3,2,1), which
indicates that Sailor 6 must be assigned first, followed by Sailor 5, then Sailor 4 and so on.
Alternatively, Subject-2 receives a different ordering (e.g., 1,3,5,6,4,2), which indicates
Sailor 1 must be assigned first, followed by Sailor 3 and so forth. Final job assignments are
expected to vary across participants on the basis of timing between job openings and sailors
availabilityjust as with professional detailers assignments. Randomization minimizes
any effect that a specific ordering of sailor assignments may have on the results. Because this
task closely resembles the professional detailing process, with knowledgeable participants
(as described below), we would expect the results of this pilot experiment to generalize well
to naval personnel practice.
Table 5:  Jobs requiring assignment
Jobs Positions 
Ship C (deploy) 2 
Ship A (in port) 1 
Recruiting duty 2 
School (advanced) 1 
Lifeguard 1 
Bartender 1 






















Subjects are drawn from the Manpower Analysis Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. These students are educated about detailing and many other
aspects of naval personnel processes. Indeed, most subjects are familiar with the detailing
process. They represent mid-career, professional military officers (e.g., at the O-3 to O-5
level) with roughly eight to 12 years experience since graduating from college. Because they
have personal familiarity with the Navy and understand the detailing process, this group of
subjects represents a relatively good proxy for professional detailers.
Experimental Procedure
Procedurally, the participating students receive a seminar-style lecture on the detailing
process as part of their graduate school coursework. This ensures the students participate in
the study. They are encouraged to perform well, as results are incorporated into their course-
grading scheme. The lecture also discusses the Personnel Mall, to familiarize participants
with agent technology and its potential application to the distribution and assignment
problem, and they are exposed to material concerning labor-market economics and two-
sided matching, to familiarize them with the economic and game-theoretic concepts
employed in the experiment. Participants are encouraged to ask questions throughout the
lecture, and an extended period for questions and answers is included at the end of the lecture.
Following this lecture, participants are told about the rationale for and nature of the
experiment, and the experimental procedures are explained. Each participant receives an
individualized package of experimental materials (e.g., listing of job openings, listing of
sailors to be assigned, rank-ordered sailor preferences, randomized orderings, job-assign-
ment forms), and each item is described. They are, again, encouraged to ask questions.
To make the job assignments, participants are instructed to complete the form included
in Appendix B. The form simply lists each sailor and requires the detailer (i.e., participant)
to fill in the specific job assignment. Participants are reminded about the above the line
rule, and they are given an opportunity to ask questions pertaining to detailing, the
experiment or anything else that may be of concern or confusion. When all materials have
been distributed and explained, an  all questions have been answered, participants are given
a maximum of 10 minutes to complete the detailing tasks. Most participants make the
required, six sailor assignments within a few minutes. When finished with the experiment,
Table 6:  Sailors and job preferences
Sailor Rank-Ordered Preferences 
Sailor 1 Lifeguard, Ship A, School, Recruiting, Ship C, Bartender 
Sailor 2 Ship C, School, Ship A, Lifeguard, Recruiting, Bartender 
Sailor 3 School, Lifeguard, Ship A, Bartender, Recruiting, Ship C 
Sailor 4 Lifeguard, Bartender, School, Ship A, Recruiting, Ship C 
Sailor 5 School, Ship A, Ship C, Recruiting, Bartender, Lifeguard 
Sailor 6 School, Ship C, Ship A, Recruiting, Bartender, Lifeguard 
 



















participants are allowed to take a break, after which they are debriefed on the results of the
experiment. Their reactions, comments and questions provide useful validation of the
experimental procedures and valuable feedback for future experiments.
Personnel Mall Tasks
As noted above, experimental results for the detailing task are compared with the
Personnel Mall for the same set of sailor/job assignments. Because the set of jobs, sailors and
relative preferences are known before the experiment, these agent-performed tasks are
completed before running the experiment. This allows the researchers to record and compile
the Mall performance results for presentation and discussion in conjunction with the
experimental results. The Personnel Mall is presented exactly the same information as the
human subjects above.
Two-Sided Matching Algorithm Tasks
The two-sided matching algorithm is also used to make sailor/job assignments, and this
algorithm is similarly presented exactly the same information as the human subjects above.
However, this matching algorithm is run two times. The first run uses a command-oriented
bias (i.e., emphasizing demand efficiency), whereas the second run uses the inverse, sailor-
oriented bias (i.e., emphasizing supply efficiency). As with the Personnel Mall above, these
tasks are also completed before conducting the experiment, and presented in conjunction
with the experimental results.
Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables are operationalized and measured in this experiment: 1)
assignment quality, 2) cycle time and 3) cost. Briefly, assignment quality represents how well
the match reflects the sailors relative preferences. For instance, if all six sailors were
assigned to the highest-ranked job (i.e., job number 1), the average assignment quality
measurement would be a perfect 1.00. Conversely, if all six sailors were assigned to the
lowest-ranked job (i.e., job number 6), the average quality measurement would be 6.00.
Thus, this quality measure reflects matching from the sailors perspective.
Cycle time measures the length of time required to complete job assignments for all six
sailors. This measure is useful to assess the relative efficiency of alternative approaches to
the detailing tasks (e.g., manual, agent-based, algorithmic) and offers empirical insight into
potential speed enhancements available via such approaches.
Process cost is calculated from sailors quasi-prices. Costs (i.e., quasi-prices) for the
six sailors are summarized in Table 7. For instance, if Sailor-1 were matched with Ship-C,
the Ship-C command would have to pay 22 units to Sailor-1. Similarly, if Sailor-2 were
matched with Ship-A, the Ship-A command would have to pay 4 units to Sailor-2.
Alternatively, if Sailor-3 were assigned to Ship-A, the Ship-A command would have to pay
a much-higher 550 units in this case. Process cost simply represents the sum of quasi-prices
across all sailor/job matches.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
To analyze the comparative detailing process results, we first summarize the experi-
mental results associated with the student participants performing detailing tasks. We then





















compare the corresponding benchmark performance measurements with detailing as per-
formed by the Personnel Mall and two-sided matching algorithm.
Human Subject Performance
Experimental data from the 20 subjects are summarized in Table 8. As outlined in the
research design above, three performance measurements are recorded for each subject: 1)
match quality, 2) time and 3) cost. Match quality represents an average of the six sailors
assigned by each subject. Cycle time is measured as total elapsed clock time from the start
of the experiment until the subject finishes the six assignments (rounded to the nearest whole
minute). Cost is computed as outlined above. Notice no entry appears for Subject 3. One
person did not participate in the experiment, due to a schedule conflict, so this subject was
dropped. Notice also the time measurement for Subject 11 is listed as n/a. This subject
failed to record the start and stop times for the experiment, so we have no cycle-time value
corresponding to this observation. The other performance data associated with this subject
are valid, however, so they are used in computing performance statistics.
Mean values and standard deviations across the 20 subjects are presented at the bottom
of this table. These values indicate the average sailor is assigned to his or her third (2.99)
preference among the jobs, the average subject requires just over three minutes (3.21) to
assign the six sailors and the average command cost incurred is 379. Notice the standard
deviation for quality (0.37) is relatively small w en compared to the mean value of match
quality, whereas standard deviations for time (1.18) and cost (273) are quite large in relative
comparison. This shows that variation associated with alternative orderings does not
produce much variation in terms of the sailor/job matches, but such ordering produces much
larger variation in terms of cycle time and huge variation in command cost. These
performance data provide a useful benchmark to compare with results from the Personnel
Mall and two-sided matching algorithms.
Personnel Mall and Algorithmic Performance
Mean performance data for the human subjects are repeated from above in Table 9 for
reference and comparison with corresponding mean data from the Personnel Mall and two
variations of the matching algorithm: command-biased and sailor-biased. As suggested by
the name, the command-biased algorithm reflects a demand-efficiency approach, in which
needs of the Navy are stressed over sailors preferences. Conversely, also suggested by the
name, the sailor-biased approach reflects a supply-efficiency approach, in which sailors
preferences are stressed over needs of the commands.
Table 7: Sailor quasi-prices
Job/Sailor Sailor 1 Sailor 2 Sailor 3 Sailor 4 Sailor 5 Sailor 6 
Ship C 22 16 15 85 10 90 
Ship A 28 4 550 100 12 85 
Recruiting 26 75 225 135 30 110 
School 20 35 14 15 850 150 
Lifeguard 24 7 12 18 5 1 
Bartender 50 200 100 16 30 110 
 



















Notice the Personnel Mall improves detailing performance across all three dimen-
sions. Specifically, average matching quality improves by almost one order of prefer-
ence (i.e., from sailors third choice to their second), the cycle time required to detail
the six sailors is reduced by more than 75% and command cost is reduced by over 80%.
A 99% confidence interval around the experimental results for match quality (2.78
3.20) indicates the difference in mean performance is significant at an alpha of 1%, as
do comparable 99% intervals for cycle time (2.693.72) and command cost (260--499).
Thus, use of the Personnel Mall appears to dominate the performance of human detailers
by a significant margin.
The two-sided matching algorithms also improve performance. In fact, both the sailor-
and command-biased matching algorithms produce the same results as the Personnel Mall
in this experiment. This reflects the relatively simple experimental design used in this
discussion. In particular, both matching algorithms and the Personnel Mall used the same
virtual prices to reflect the sailors job preferences. Furthermore, both matching algorithms
assumed that the commands preferred job candidates with lower virtual prices. This
command preference ranking guarantees that the sailor- and command-biased algorithms
Subject Quality Time Cost 
Subject 1 2.67 4 476 
Subject 2 3.17 2 295 
Subject 4 2.67 3 270 
Subject 5 3.17 3 280 
Subject 6 3.67 3 1376 
Subject 7 2.67 3 479 
Subject 8 3.17 3 726 
Subject 9 3.33 5 487 
Subject 10 3.17 2 486 
Subject 11 2.33 n/a 177 
Subject 12 2.67 2 242 
Subject 13 2.50 4 175 
Subject 14 2.83 2 193 
Subject 15 3.33 4 248 
Subject 16 3.50 5 302 
Subject 17 2.67 5 274 
Subject 18 3.17 2 280 
Subject 19 2.67 5 182 
Subject 20 3.33 2 297 
Subject 21 3.17 2 342 
Mean 2.99 3.21 379 
StdDev 0.37 1.18 273 
Table 8:  Performance data





















produce the same outcomes, and that the matching algorithms produce the same outcome as
the Personnel Mall.  With divergent and more complex sailor and command rankings, the
Personnel Mall, Sailor-biased matching algorithm and command-biased matching algo-
rithm could all produce different outcomes. Future analysis will explore these differences.
However, the Personnel Mall and two-sided matching algorithms exhibit a serious flaw
not captured in these statistics:  two of the high-priority jobs (i.e., those listed above the
line) remain unfilled by their sailor/job matches. Specifically, the Personnel Mall and
matching algorithms executed their sailor/job matches as summarized in Table 10. Clearly,
with eight job positions to fill and only six sailors available for assignment, some jobs must
go unfilled, but none of these automated approaches matched a sailor to the second Ship-C
position or the second recruiting position (labeled Ship C  2 and Recruiting  2 in the
table). Instead, the Personnel Mall and matching algorithms assigned sailors to the lifeguard
and bartender jobs. Thus, the Personnel Mall and two-sided algorithms, as currently
designed, do not conform to Navy rules requiring that high-priority jobs (i.e., those above
the line) be filled first.
For comparison, Table 10 also includes the sailor/job assignments made by Subject-
5, whose performance corresponds closely with the mean values for the sample of 20
students; that is, the sailor/job matching performance of Sailor-5 represents that of the
average student participant. Notice this participant is able to conform to the above the line
rule, appropriately leaving unfilled the lower-priority lifeguard and bartender jobs. Thus, we
have mixed results from this pilot experiment:  the Personnel Mall and two-sided matching
algorithm significantly improve erformance of the detailing processacross all three
performance dimensionsover experimental participants, but only the manual process
necessarily conforms to all Navy distribution and assignment rules in this experiment.
For insight into this performance disparity, we refer back to comments made in our
introductory remarks, particularly those associated with the relative immaturity of agent
technology, as well as wide differences in terms of efficacy associated with agent designs and
designers. In the case of the Personnel Mall, it is designed for speed and to automate the basic
tasks required for sailor/job matching. Although it considers rules such as the above the
line job-placement policy from above, a conflict exists between adhering to this rule and
making job assignments based on sailor quasi-prices. In other words, where a conflict exists,
this agent system is currently designed to serve the sailors interests at the expense of the
commands. Clearly, we can change the rules to have the agents serve commands interests
ahead of sailors in such cases, but then the sailors would not be as satisfied with the matches.
This calls for additional research along the lines of this investigation, for we may be able to
develop rules and algorithms that satisfy commands and sailors preferences and adhere to
Table 9:  Comparative mean performance data
Approach Quality Time Cost 
Human Subjects 2.99 3.21 379 
99% Confidence Interval (2.78-3.20) (2.69-3.72) (260-499) 
Personnel Mall 2.00 0.75 71 
Command-Biased Matching Algorithm 2.00 n/a 71 
Sailor-Biased Matching Algorithm 2.00 n/a 71 



















all rules and policies. Through results such as those described from this experiment, that
insight into such rules and algorithms is developed.
To summarize, this experiment indicates that the Personnel Mall and two-sided
matching algorithm can significantly improve detailing process performance.  However,
these approaches are currently inferior to human detailers when rule conformance is
required. This simple experiment helps shed light on the relative capabilities of people in the
distribution and assignment domain, with respect to software-agent and algorithmic ap-
proaches. Additional investigation into the Personnel Mall and two-sided matching algo-
rithms is required to address the rules conformance issue.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Two modes of matching people with jobs prevail at present: hierarchical planning and
distributed markets. Each has strengths and limitations, but few systems have been designed
to take advantage of strengths corresponding to both. With evolving information technology,
however, the job-matching process could be accomplished far more equitably and efficiently
using Web-based markets within the firm, and intelligent agents offer excellent potential to
help both potential employees and employers find one another in a distributed, electronic
marketplace. But realizing this potential goes well beyond simply changing the rules of
internal job matching or making agent technology available to job searchers. Rather, the
corresponding markets and technologies must be designed, together, to mutually accomplish
the desired results (e.g., efficient and effective matching) and conform to necessary
properties (e.g., market clearing).
This chapter drew on Game Theory results to assess the feasibility of using two-sided
matching algorithms to address this market-design problem. We also drew from current
agent research to address the information technology dimension of the problem by imple-
menting a proof-of-concept multi-agent system to enact, automate and support the corre-
sponding market solution. Capitalizing on the best aspects of two-sided matching and the
Personnel Mall approaches to the market-design problem, we integrated the key economic
and technological elements required to design robust electronic employment markets.
Job\Approach Personnel-
Mall 
Command-Bias Sailor-Bias Subject-5 
Ship C  1 2 2 2 5 
Ship C  2    6 
Ship A  5 5 5 3 
Recruiting  1 1 1 1 1 
Recruiting  2    4 
School  6 6 6 2 
Lifeguard 3 3 3  
Bartender 4 4 4  
 
Table 10:  Sailor/job assignments





















This chapter also presented preliminary results from a pilot experiment comparing
performance for the current human-based detailing process to the Personnel Mall and to both
sailor- and command-biased matching algorithms.  These results indicate that an integrated
Personnel Mall/matching algorithm can potentially reduce cycle-time, and improve both
supply and demand efficiency.  However, the human-based detailing process currently
provides better rule conformance, though human-based processes may have a harder time
providing rule conformance as the number of rules expands.
Rule conformance requires some centralized control over the labor market; some kind
of agent (e.g., human, software) appears necessary to address Navy concerns. Development,
implementation and integration of such human or software agents represent an important
area for future research, as does continued exploration into the emergent properties and
behaviors associated with federations of intelligent (human and software) agents and
improving user-interface designs. In addition to such technical research, economic issues
such as constructing and managing variable bonuses to replicate compensating wage
differentials, or how to impede user gaming of electronic employment marketsrequires
near-term attention.
There is clearly much research to be accomplished before robust, electronic employ-
ment markets are ready for industrial strength implementation in the enterprise. Such
research should necessarily be multi-disciplinary and integrative in nature. Economic and
technological elements associated with labor-market design are inextricably intertwined; a
robust design cannot be achieved without integrating both. This research has taken a step in
this direction. We hope to help stimulate future work along these lines.
APPENDIX AINTEGRATED EMPLOYMENT
MARKET AND AGENT DESIGN
Describing potential matching algorithms helps illustrate the issues involved in
adapting the Personnel Mall to two-sided matching markets. To simplify, suppose each
command (company) requires one sailor (employee) to fill one job vacancy, and each sailor
can only fill one billet (job vacancy). Furthermore, salaries are predetermined and invariant
for each billet. This one-to-one matching process is equivalent to the marriage market
(Gale and Shapley, 1962; Crawford, 1988; Harrison and McCabe, 1989; Roth, 1990, pp. 15-
121). In a simple job-matching model, salary can be considered a job characteristic that
affects sailors job preferences, along with work environment, promotion prospects, job
location/commute, etc. This simplified model provides a convenient starting point. In more
complicated two-sided matching models, commands can hire groups of sailors for particular
jobs (e.g., several software programmers to develop a new product), and wages vary during
the matching process as necessary to balance supply and demand for high-priority undesir-
able jobs. These extensions will be considered briefly.
In the one-to-one matching model, the matching algorithm begins when commands
identify and rank all available sailors qualified to fill a job vacancy. Commands then extend
job offers to their highest ranked candidate. Sailors with multiple offers tentatively accept
the job proposal they most prefer; sailors reject offers they consider unacceptable (i.e., they
would rather not work than accept that offer). Commands that have unfilled billets after this
first round extend offers to their second highest ranked candidate, whether or not that sailor
has entered a tentative agreement. Again, sailors tentatively accept their preferred offer
(potentially rejecting offers accepted in the previous round) and reject less preferred or



















unacceptable proposals. The process continues through additional rounds until no tentative
agreement or newly tendered offer is rejected. In each round, commands with unfilled billets
extend offers to their highest ranked candidate that has not previously rejected their offer.
After completing this process, some billets may remain unfilled (if all acceptable candidates
are assigned to billets the sailors prefer to the unfilled vacancies). Similarly, some sailors may
be unemployed (if all acceptable billets are filled with candidates preferred by the commands).
However, there are never unemployed sailors if sailors are in short supply, as in todays Navy,
and any billet is better than no billet (i.e., unemployment is unacceptable for naval personnel).
Roth (1990) has shown that this matching algorithm produces a stable outcome (there
are no commands or sailors who are not matched to one another in the final outcome, but who
prefer each other to their final assignments). However, this algorithm produces an outcome
that emphasizes command relative to sailor preferences (an command-optimal outcome).
Reversing command/sailor roles generates an alternative stable outcome that favors sailors
(a sailor-optimal outcome). In this case, candidates offer to work for their preferred
command; commands accept their preferred offer and reject unacceptable proposals. As
above, the sailor-optimal outcome may include unfilled billets and unmatched personnel. In
fact, the unfilled billets and unmatched sailors are the same in both the command-optimal
and sailor-optimal algorithms. Both algorithms fill the same billets and assign the same
sailors, but different sailors fill different billets.
The iterative nature of the one-to-one matching (marriage) model is the primary
difference between this model and current Personnel Mall applications. Furthermore, this
iterative process is required to incorporate both demand and supply efficiencies. This
iterative process effectively converts the labor market application from a one-sided match-
ing model to a two-sided matching model. Thus, this is one critical extension.
Allowing commands to hire multiple sailors for a particular job (many-to-one matching
or the college admissions model) complicates the matching process (Roth, 1985; 1990, pp.
123-186). Commands extend several offers (up to the number of unfilled billets), and
tentative matches involve groups of sailors. However, the matching process involves the
same iterative nature. This extension is compatible with the Personnel Mall technology.
Command agents simply shop for multiple candidates to fill a particular job.
Prioritizing jobs also requires a two-sided matching model/Personnel Mall extension.
In competitive markets, priorities are determined by the value of the output that labor
produces and reflected in the wages employers are willing to pay. If there are labor shortages,
higher valued employers will increase the wage rate to attract sufficient labor; lower valued
users will drop out. In closed-system internal labor markets, such as DoN, wage rates do not
adjust to reflect labor shortages and job priorities. Hierarchical labor markets use adminis-
trative processes to incorporate relative job values (e.g., administratively prioritizing jobs
by function/mission). The two-sided matching model/Personnel Mall application just
described does not consider job priorities. Thus, the unfilled billets at the end of the matching
process may be high-priority, but less desirable jobs.





















Variable bonuses (salaries) can be used in a two-sided matching market to reflect job
priority. The term bonuses suggests that this compensation can take various forms (e.g.,
wage supplements; benefits, including release time, conference travel; brownie points that
influence future promotions or job assignments; etc.). Bonuses act as compensating wage
differentials in competitive labor markets. In particular, bonuses can be offered for the
important but undesirable jobs left unfilled. During the iterative matching process, bonuses
can change as appropriate until high priority jobs are voluntarily filled with appropriately
skilled personnel. In the two-sided matching process, this complicates the matching
algorithm (Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, pp. 171-86); in the
Personnel Mall specification, this requires updating prices before each shopping iteration.
And prices, in this labor-market context, refer specifically to some kind of variable bonus
or compensating wage differential.
One of the critical issues in this extension involves how the bonuses are established
(e.g., offered by employers, demanded by candidates or established through a bidding
process). Alternative schemes to determine the required bonuses will have implications
for how commands and sailors behave (strategic behavior) and the resulting distribution
of sailors across billets. If bonuses are pre-announced and never updated, they may not
effectively balance demand and supply for high-priority undesirable billets. If bonuses
are systematically increased over time until sailors accept the high-priority undesirable
billets, sailors have an incentive to delay the match to receive a higher bonus; but they
risk someone else filling the billet during their holdout. Finally, bonuses can be
determined through a bidding (auction) process designed to identify the minimum bonus
that attracts the sailor most willing to accept the assignment in question (Vickery, 1961;
Myerson, 1981, 1983; Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Regardless of the mechanism used
to determine the bonus, the impact on the matching process/Personnel Mall is effec-
tively the same. (Assignment games provide an alternative approach: Demange and
Gale, 1985; Demange, Gale and Sotomayor, 1986; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, pp. 202-
39; Shubik, 1984, pp. 191-225)
This discussion suggests some potential issues in integrating Personnel Malls and two-
sided matching models to address labor market issues. The relevant modifications will likely
depend on the specific characteristics of the labor market involved. For example, assign-
ment-related bonuses are critical for DoNs detailing process. DoN faces a labor shortage
and an institutionally constrained compensation system. Without compensating wage
differentials, DoN may have trouble filling high-priority undesirable billets using a two-
sided matching model (as opposed to DoNs current one-sided hierarchical matching
model). A bonus system might be less relevant for commercial firms with variable wage rates
and no labor shortage. Successfully integrating the Personnel Mall and two-sided matching
models requires accurately characterizing the labor market and identifying the relevant
model modifications. It now remains to investigate a specific labor market, in detail, in order
to determine the particular market and agent mechanisms and specifications.




















Navy Personnel Detailing Task
Profs. Bill Gates and Mark Nissen
Please wait for instructions.
___________________________ ____________ ____________
Print your name Start time Stop time
General
You are acting as an enlisted personnel detailing specialist assigned to match a small
group of sailors with jobs at several naval commands that need to be filled immediately. The
Navy has a policy of first filling the most important jobs (i.e., those listed above the line),
and although specific job preferences of sailors are important, the needs of naval commands
take precedence. Also, you must make assignments on a first-come-first-served basis; that
is, assign each sailor in the order noted below (see reverse side of form).
Instructions
The jobs to be filled are listed below. All high-priority jobs must be filled before
placements are made to less-urgent jobs. Consider sailors preferences to the maximum
extent practical without jeopardizing high-priority assignments. Assign each sailor accord-
ing to the specific order shown overleaf in the Specific Order of Sailor Assignments section.
Place your name on this form and turn it in when instructed to do so. Also note the start time
when instructed to begin, and note the stop time when finished making all assignments.
Jobs to be Filled
Jobs are organized in two categories: 1) high-priority jobs are listed above the line,
and 2) less-urgent jobs are listed below the line.
Above the line
• Ship A (in port)  1 job to fill
• Ship C (deploy)  2 jobs to fill
• Recruiting duty  2 jobs to fill
_________________________________________________________________
Below the line
• Lifeguard (NPS)  1 job to fill
• School (advanced)  1 job to fill
• Bartender (NPS)  1 job to fill






















The sailors and corresponding job preferences are listed below. Jobs are listed in order
of preference for each sailor.
• Sailor 1  Lifeguard, Ship A, School, Recruiting, Ship C, Bartender
• Sailor 2  Ship C, School, Ship A, Lifeguard, Recruiting, Bartender
• Sailor 3  School, Lifeguard, Ship A, Bartender, Recruiting, Ship C
• Sailor 4  Lifeguard, Bartender, School, Ship A, Recruiting, Ship C
• Sailor 5  School, Ship A, Ship C, Recruiting, Bartender, Lifeguard
• Sailor 6  School, Ship C, Ship A, Recruiting, Bartender, Lifeguard
Specific Order of Sailor Assignments
Assign sailors in the specific order noted below. For instance, if Sailor 1 has a 3 next
to it, you would make this your third assignment, and if Sailor 6 has a 1 next to it, you would
make this your first assignment. Write the job assigned next to each sailor below.
______ Sailor 1: _____________________________________
______ Sailor 2: _____________________________________
______ Sailor 3: _____________________________________
______ Sailor 4: _____________________________________
______ Sailor 5: _____________________________________
______ Sailor 6: _____________________________________
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